Board of Contract Appeals General Services Administration Washington, D.C. 20405 ___________________ October 27, 1998 ___________________ GSBCA 14652-RATE In the Matter of STEVENS WORLDWIDE VAN LINES M.A. Ross, Credit/Collection Manager, Stevens Worldwide Van Lines, Saginaw, MI, Claimant. James F. Fitzgerald, Director, Transportation Audits Division, General Services Administration, Washington, DC, appearing for General Services Administration. NEILL, Board Judge. This case concerns a request by Stevens Worldwide Van Lines (Stevens) for payment of a supplemental invoice for transportation services rendered in 1994. The General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Transportation Audits (OTA) (now the Transportation Audits Division) rejected the claim as untimely filed. For the reasons set out below, we find that Stevens has not met its burden of proving that the claim was timely filed. We, therefore, affirm OTA s rejection of the claim. Background The cargo in this case was moved by Stevens under Government Bill of Lading (GBL) No. VP-418872. The GBL was issued by Clarence H. Reynolds, a senior traffic management specialist assigned to GSA's Traffic Management Branch in San Francisco, California. The GBL called for the movement of household goods and personal effects from Kalae Molokai in Hawaii to Hobart, Washington. It also provided for an extra pickup of items in Klamath Falls, Oregon, also for delivery to Hobart. The GBL provided that charges were to be billed to: DOI [Department of Interior] C/O United Transportation Services Inc. P.O. Box 12218 Winston-Salem, NC 27117-2218 With a public voucher for transportation charges, dated December 31, 1994, and sent to "DOI, NAT'L PARK SERV" at the above mentioned post office box in Winston-Salem, Stevens billed DOI for the transport of household goods and personal effects from Hawaii to Hobart, Washington. These goods were delivered on November 14, 1994. A copy of Stevens' invoice has been provided by the claimant for the record. It contains a handwritten notation on the bottom left-hand corner which reads: "Paid 3-13- 95." GSA advises us that the Government's payment voucher covering this invoice payment is dated March 9, 1995. The record also contains a copy of a supplemental invoice for $995.40. This invoice, according to Stevens, covered the cost of the extra pick-up made under the same GBL but delivered to Hobart on December 8, 1994 . The supplemental invoice is dated October 30, 1995. It references GBL No. VP-418872 and, like the original invoice, is addressed to the DOI at the post office box in Winston-Salem. DOI did not pay Stevens' supplemental invoice of October 30, 1995. Stevens claims that it wrote to DOI about this matter in December 1996. The record contains what is said to be a copy of a letter sent by regular mail to DOI by Stevens' accounts receivable supervisor. It states that, according to Stevens' records, the invoice is still outstanding. It, therefore, requests payment. The record also contains a copy of a letter Stevens claims to have sent to Clarence Reynolds, the GSA official in San Francisco who issued the original GBL. The letter is dated June 4, 1997, and provides Mr. Reynolds with a copy of the supplemental invoice; it explains that payment has still not been received despite numerous letters to DOI. The letter closes with a request that Mr. Reynolds suggest persons whom the carrier might call or write to in an effort to have the supplemental invoice paid. GSA advises us that neither Mr. Reynolds nor DOI can confirm receipt of the supplemental invoice or the other documentation submitted by Stevens in support of its contention that collection attempts were made. On March 11, 1998, Stevens transmitted to OTA s office in Washington, by telefacsimile, a copy of its supplemental invoice. OTA, after examining the invoice and the documentation submitted with it, concluded that the invoice was not submitted within the prescribed statutory period of limitations. The invoice was, therefore, returned to Stevens. Stevens has appealed this determination of OTA. Discussion Section 3726 of Title 31 of the United States Code imposes a time limitation on the filing of carrier claims with GSA. Subsection (a) provides: (a) A carrier or freight forwarder presenting a bill for transporting an individual or property for the United States Government may be paid before the Administrator of General Services conducts an audit, in accordance with regulations that the Administrator shall prescribe. A claim under this section shall be allowed only if it is received by the Administrator no later than 3 years (excluding time of war) after the later of the following dates: (1) accrual of the claim; (2) payment for the transportation is made; (3) refund for an overpayment for the transportation is made; or (4) a deduction under subsection (b) of this section is made. The regulations issued by the Administrator of General Services which implement this statute provide that a claim is considered "received" by the Administrator if received by GSA or its "designee," namely, "the agency out of whose activities the claim arose." 41 CFR 101-41.602(b) (1994). Stevens asks that we consider reversing OTA's determination for three reasons. First, Stevens asks that we note the supplemental invoice itself is not yet three years old but rather bears the date of October 30, 1995. Secondly, Stevens points out that, after submission of the invoice, various collection attempts were made. Finally, Stevens reminds us that the original invoice payment was posted on March 13, 1995, not quite three years prior to March 11, 1998, the date on which the invoice was submitted to OTA. Stevens' first and second arguments are best discussed together. It is true that the invoice bears the date of October 30, 1995. The difficulty in this case, however, is that neither DOI nor GSA can confirm receipt of the invoice or of the documentation which Stevens has produced as evidence of its various collection efforts made after submission of the original supplemental invoice. The burden of proving receipt of a claim in the proper office within the statutory period of limitations rests with the claimant. The material submitted here in support of the allegation of numerous contacts is less than compelling in the face of the denials of DOI and GSA. Stevens contends that collection attempts were in fact made "through letters, monthly statements and telephone calls to DOI and Mr. Reynolds . . . ." In support of this contention, claimant has provided us with a copy of the original supplemental invoice, one letter to DOI, one letter to Mr. Reynolds, and one monthly statement dated "10/31/97." No information is provided regarding the alleged telephone contacts. Unfortunately, claimant has no evidence, such as a certified mail receipt, which would verify receipt of the invoice or other documentation allegedly sent to DOI and/or Mr. Reynolds at GSA. The Comptroller General, who, previous to this Board, decided transportation claims such as this, held that copies of correspondence, without other substantiating evidence, were not sufficient to verify receipt of a claim for purposes of tolling a statute of limitations. Coast Counties Express, Inc., B-227179.2 (Jan. 5, 1990); Continental Air Lines, Inc., B-182614 (Dec. 16, 1974) (involving a predecessor to 31 U.S.C. 3726). We consider this a prudent rule and follow it here. The materials provided by claimant are not enough, in and of themselves, to prove that either DOI or GSA actually received the supplemental invoice or were otherwise on notice of the claim it contained prior to March 11, 1998. In the absence of persuasive proof that the invoice was submitted or that the Government was otherwise put on notice of this claim through various collection efforts prior to March 11, 1998, we are left with the task of determining whether the three- year period allowed by law for submission of transportation claims had expired by March 11, 1998. In this regard, Stevens asks that we take note of the fact that its copy of the original invoice has a handwritten notation on it which reads: "Paid 3-13- 95." Stevens believes that the significance of this handwritten entry rests in the fact that the applicable statute of limitation, as noted earlier, provides that a claim shall be allowed only if it is received no later than three years after the later of the four possible events listed in the statute. Stevens argues that, in this case, the latest event from which the three-year period should be reckoned for filing a claim for the cost of the pick-up shipment is the date on which payment was made of the original invoice for the cost of the principal shipment from Hawaii to Washington. If that date was March 13, 1995, as Stevens contends, then submission of the supplemental invoice to GSA on March 11, 1998, would be within three years of payment. We recognize, of course, that Stevens' use of the alleged payment date for the principal shipment from Hawaii to Washington may well be open to question. The supplemental invoice at issue here covers only the extra pick-up and delivery. Arguably, since it has never been paid, the three-year period for submitting a claim for this shipment should run from a much earlier date, namely, December 8, 1994, the date on which the pick-up was delivered and the right to payment for it, therefore, accrued. Nevertheless, since our conclusion is the same regardless of whether one uses the correct date of payment for the original invoice or the date on which the right to payment for the pick-up shipment accrued, we will accept, for purposes of this decision, Stevens' liberal application of the statute. Stevens' claim that payment was made on March 13, 1995, does not survive analysis. Notwithstanding the notation on the claimant's copy of its invoice, we are not prepared to accept March 13 as the actual payment date. Rather, we consider March 13 to be nothing more than the date on which Stevens received and posted payment. Were Stevens not dealing with the United States Government, this date might well have been deemed the payment date under the general common law receipt rule. Under that rule: Payment is not effectuated by sending the amount due to the creditor by mail or other public carrier until the remittance gets into the hands of the creditor . . . . 70 C.J.S. Payment 9 (1987) (footnotes omitted). The receipt rule, however, has no application here. By statute in effect at the time both shipments were made -- and still in effect -- a payment due to a contractor dealing with the United States Government "is deemed to be made on the date a check for payment is dated or an electronic fund transfer is made." 31 U.S.C. 3901(a)(5) (1994). We agree with GSA, therefore, that March 9, the date shown on the Government's payment voucher, rather than March 13, 1995, should be taken as the date of payment of Stevens' original invoice. Consequently, the carrier s submission of a supplemental invoice on March 11, 1998, was not timely. In sum, we find the reasons advanced by Stevens in support of the timeliness of its claim unconvincing. Consequently, we will not disturb OTA s earlier determination that the claim is untimely. The claimant s appeal of the OTA determination is, therefore, denied. ___________________________ EDWIN B. NEILL Board Judge