_________________________________________________
 
                  MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED: 
                            January 13, 1994
           _________________________________________________
 
                         
                    GSBCA 10971-R, 10975-R, 11942-R
 
 
                     301 HOWARD STREET ASSOCIATES,
 
                                                Appellant,
 
                                   v.
 
                    GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
 
                                                 Respondent.
 
        Patrick Martell and Bryant Zimmerman of Pettit & Martin, San
   Francisco, CA, counsel for Appellant.
 
        Robert W. Schlattman  and M. Leah Wright,  Office of General
   Counsel, General Services Administration, Washington, DC, counsel
   for Respondent.
 
   Before Board Judges LaBELLA, BORWICK, and WILLIAMS.
 
   LaBELLA, Board Judge.
 
        On September 30, 1993, we granted  in part the appeal of 301
   Howard Street Associates  involving a lease of  commercial office
   space.     301  Howard  Street  Associates  v.  General  Services
   Administration,  GSBCA  10971,  et  al.  (Sept.  30,  1993).   On
   November 1, 1993, the General Services Administration (GSA) filed
   a Motion for  Reconsideration pursuant to  Board Rule 32  seeking
   reconsidera- tion  of the remedy  awarded to appellant  for GSA's
   changes to  the lease under  the Changes clause.   In its motion,
   GSA contends that  the remedy applied by the  Board was incorrect
   as a matter of law.   Appellant opposes GSA's motion  and further
   complains that  the remedy  the Board  granted was  inadequate to
   compensate appellant  for damages caused  by the delay.   We deny
   the Government's motion.
 
                               Discussion
 
        As we have previously stated,  "we are less than enamored of
   motions to  reconsider."  International  Business Machines Corp.,
   GSBCA 11359-P-R, 92-1 BCA    24,438, at 121,945, 1991 BPD    273,
   at  3.    We  will not  grant  reconsideration  on  the basis  of
   arguments already made  or on reinterpretations of  old evidence.
   Id.;   see  also   Rule   32(a).[foot #] 1      While   we   deny
   reconsideration  because the  Government's  argument should  have
   been raised prior to our  decision in the matter, we nevertheless
   take this opportunity to explain why the Government's argument is
   meritless.
 
 
        GSA  argues  that  the  remedy  awarded  in  the  appeal  is
   incorrect as  a matter of  law in  light of  the Board's  correct
   decision that the delay in providing layout drawings to appellant
   was a  constructive change pursuant  to the Changes clause.   GSA
   contends that appellant  cannot recover the rent that  it did not
   receive  during the  delay period  under the  Changes  clause and
   relies entirely on  Coley Properties Corp. v.  United States, 593
   F.2d 380 (Ct. Cl. 1979), in advancing this argument.
 
        Respondent's reliance  on Coley is misplaced.  In Coley, the
   plaintiff challenged  a decision of  the Postal Service  Board of
   Contract Appeals denying recovery of certain  costs and losses it
   incurred as a result of  delays the Post Office Department caused
   in  the construction of  a postal facility  and commercial office
   tower by plaintiff.  Under the contract, Coley agreed to purchase
   land owned by  the Government, build a single  building housing a
   postal facility  and  commercial office  tower on  the site,  and
   lease the postal portion of the building for an agreed-upon term.
   593  F.2d at  382.  As  a practical  matter, construction  of the
   commercial office tower could not  begin until the postal portion
   was topped off.   Id.  During  the construction period,  the Post
   Office  ordered a  large number  of changes  which resulted  in a
   delay completing both  the postal portion and office  tower.  Id.
   at 383.  As part of its  claim for an equitable adjustment, Coley
   sought  the  amount of  rent  it  would  have received  from  the
   commercial office  space located in  the tower for the  period of
   delay.  Id.
 
        The Court of Claims held  that Coley was not entitled to  an
   equitable adjustment under the Changes clause for the rent it did
   not receive during  the period of delay.   593 F.2d at 385.   The
   court  stated that  the  purpose  of the  Changes  clause was  to
   compensate the contractor  for additional, unanticipated  out-of-
   pocket expenses incurred  in performing the contract  as a result
   of the changes.  Id.  The court found that the loss of income was
   not an additional cost of performance of the contract even though
   Coley  suffered economic  detriment when  it did not  receive the
   rents it expected during the period of delay.  Id.
 
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 1   58 Fed.  Reg.  69,246,  69,264  (1993)  (to  be
   codified  at 48 CFR  6101.32(a)).   Board's amended  rules became
   effective on January 3, 1994.  The amendment to Rule 32(a) merely
   codifies existing case law on this issue.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
 
        The  situation  in  Coley   is  distinguishable  from   that
   presented in  this appeal.   The  contract in  Coley was for  the
   purchase  of  land,   construction  of  a  postal   facility  and
   commercial office tower, and lease of the postal facility back to
   the Government.   The lost rent  which Coley was seeking  was for
   the  space  in  the  commercial  office  tower,  not  the  postal
   facility.   The rent sought was for space  which had not yet been
   constructed  at the  time the parties  entered into  the contract
   and, thus,  unlike 301  Howard Street  Associates,  there was  no
   diminution  in  the  structure's useful  life  stemming  from the
   Government's delay.   The court in  Coley was addressing  whether
   the  delayed income  from third  parties  renting the  commercial
   space to be  constructed by  Coley was a  cost of performing  the
   contract with the  Government.  In that case,  the delayed income
   from third parties was not a cost of performance.
 
        This  appeal does  not involve  determining whether  delayed
   income from a third party  for commercial space to be constructed
   by the  contractor is a  cost of performance.   Appellant's lease
   involved the lease  of existing  commercial office  space to  the
   Government.   Most  significantly,  the focus  of  this case  was
   whether  the Government  had to  pay  damages for  lost (reduced)
   marketability  of an existing  structure with an  established and
   ongoing useful life when it delayed in providing layout plans for
   space  it was  leasing.   Lost marketability  was applied  as the
   proper measure of damages because  the total income that could be
   obtained  from an existing structure decreases as the structure's
   useful life  decreases.   The Government's  significant delay  in
   providing the layout  drawings and, ultimately, in  occupying the
   existing  space decreased  the  amount of  income  that could  be
   derived  from the structure.  Because appellant could not foresee
   that there  would be such  delays, it  did not  take the  reduced
   marketability of the property into consideration when negotiating
   rent  for the  space.  Thus,  instead of facing  a delayed income
   stream from a building  yet to be constructed and with its entire
   useful life  ahead of it as  in Coley, appellant faced  a delayed
   income stream from a structure with a shortened  useful life.  We
   found that  the lost marketability  for the existing space  was a
   cost  of performance of the contract  which entitled appellant to
   damages.  301 Howard Street Associates, slip op. at 27.  Thus, we
   reject the  Government's attempt, late  as it is, to  apply Coley
   here.  
 
        In  its   opposition   to  the   Government's   Motion   for
   Reconsideration, appellant  avers that the award  was inadequate.
   As in its  previous submissions during the course  of the appeal,
   appellant argues that the delay in  providing the layout drawings
   was a breach of the  lease, rather than a change, which  entitles
   it to recover lost rent as breach of lease damages.
 
        Appellant's  arguments that the  Board should reconsider the
   amount of  the award and grant  an increased amount as  breach of
   lease damages are untimely.  Rule 32(c)  states that a motion for
   reconsideration must  be filed within  30 days after the  date of
   receipt   of  the   moving  party   of   the  decision.[foot #] 2
   Appellant advances its  argument concerning the award  well after
   the thirty  day deadline.   Therefore, we  will not  consider its
   arguments.
 
 
                                Decision
 
        The Government's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
 
 
 
                                      __________________________
                                      VINCENT A. LaBELLA
                                      Board Judge
 
 
   We concur:
   _________________________
   ANTHONY S. BORWICK
   Board Judge
   __________________________
   Mary Ellen Coster Williams
   Board Judge
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 2  The thirty  day deadline in  Rule 32(c) was  not
   changed by the Board's amendments to its rules.