GRANTED: February 1, 1993 GSBCA 11959, 11960 INFORMATION HANDLING SERVICES, INC., Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. Sharon E. Nelson, c/o David F. Blunk, Finance Division, Information Handling Services, Inc., Englewood, CO, counsel for Appellant. John E. Cornell and Michael D. Tully, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges PARKER and HYATT. PARKER, Board Judge. Information Handling Services, Inc., appellant, has asked the Board to rule that the General Services Administration (GSA), respondent, is liable for certain taxes that agencies which purchased microfilms under two Federal Supply Schedule contracts refused to pay. Appellant requested that we follow our accelerated procedure, Rule 14, and both parties have agreed to present their cases on the record, Rule 11. Respondent's schedule contracting officer has ruled that both contracts shift liability for payment of these taxes to the Government, although she contends that appellant must petition each delinquent user agency, rather than the GSA schedule contracting officer. Accordingly, respondent moves to dismiss these cases for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that appellant failed to exhaust administrative remedies. We hold that appellant has done all that it needs to do with respect to the user agencies, and that the Board has jurisdiction over this claim. Thus, we deny respondent's motion. We also grant the appeals. Findings of Fact 1. On September 7, 1984, respondent awarded appellant contract number GS-01F-09034, which was a three-year multiple- award Federal Supply Schedule contract. Appeal File, GSBCA 11959, Exhibit 2. Appellant was to supply federal agencies with "subscription services," which are microfilm and microfiche copies of technical data. Id., Exhibit 1 at 46. On October 16, 1987, respondent awarded appellant a second subscription services contract, number GS-02F-48507, which was to run approximately three years. Appeal File, GSBCA 11960, Exhibit 2 at 1-2. 2. The first contract contained a state and local taxes clause, which stated the following: Notwithstanding the provisions of the clause entitled "Federal, State, and Local Taxes" of GSA Form 1424, the contract price excludes all State and Local taxes levied on or measured by the contract or sales price of the contract or completed supplies furnished under this contract. Taxes excluded from the contract price pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be separately stated on the Contractor's invoices and the Government agrees either to pay the Contractor amounts covering such taxes or to provide evidence necessary to sustain an exemption therefrom. Appeal File, GSBCA 11959, Exhibit 1 at 16-17, citing GSA Regulation (GSAR) 552.229-71 (Sept. 1978). The second contract contained a revised version of GSAR 552.229-71 (April 1984), which differed from the first by referencing the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), rather than GSA Form 1424, to wit: "Notwithstanding the provisions of the clause entitled 'Federal, State, and Local Taxes' (see FAR 29.401-1) . . . ." Appeal File, GSBCA 11960, Exhibit 1 at 16-17 (emphasis added). The clauses were in substance identical. 3. Appellant separately listed the amount of levied state and local taxes on invoices sent to the agencies which had placed orders under the contracts. Although appellant asked for payment in full, some agencies refused to pay the taxes. By April 30, 1992, the Government under the first contract was liable for $26,792.93 in gross receipts taxes levied by Alabama, plus $88.64 levied by New Mexico. Appeal File, GSBCA 11959, Exhibit 5. Concerning acceptance of goods, this contract provided that the Government would pay on the thirtieth calendar day after the latter of the date of receipt of a proper invoice, or the date the Government accepts the supplies. Id., Exhibit 1 at 31. 4. For sales under the second contract, Alabama levied a rental tax, Appeal File, GSBCA 11960, Exhibit 9, while Arizona and Hawaii assessed sales taxes, id., Exhibits 10-11, and New Mexico levied a gross receipts tax, id., Exhibit 13. Appellant compiled copies of checks it wrote to the taxing authorities in Alabama, id., Exhibit 16, Arizona, id., Exhibit 18, Hawaii, id., Exhibit 20, and New Mexico, id., Exhibit 22, as proof that it paid these taxes. Concerning acceptance of goods, this contract provided that "the Government assumes title upon delivery and acceptance at destination, and payment should be made upon the contractor's submission of proper invoices or vouchers." Id., Exhibit 1 at 31. 5. Both contracts included the standard "schedule contract administration" clause, which provides that: The schedule contracting officer shall - (a) Exercise general supervision of schedule contracts; (b) Issue final decisions on all disputes which relate to schedule contracts, or arise under orders which cannot be resolved by the ordering office and the contractor; (c) When necessary, terminate schedule contracts for default or for the convenience of the Government (see Part 49); and (d) Make necessary changes to the schedule . . . . 48 CFR 38.205(b) (1984) (FAR 38.205(b)) (emphasis added). 6. Both contracts also included a "requirements contract" clause, which provides that: (b) Application. A requirements contract may be used when the Government anticipates recurring requirements but cannot predetermine the precise quantities of supplies or services that designated Government activities will need during a definite period. Generally, a requirements contract is appropriate for items or services that are commercial products or commercial-type products (see 11.001). Funds are obligated by each delivery order, not by the contract itself. FAR 16.503(b) (1984) (emphasis added). 7. On April 30, 1992, appellant filed with the GSA schedule contracting officer a claim for $26,881.57 for taxes that agencies had refused to pay under the first contract. Appeal File, GSBCA 11959, Exhibit 3. Appellant attached the invoices sent to agencies and checks that appellant wrote to New Mexico and Alabama. Id., Exhibits 5-7. Concerning the second contract, appellant on March 15, 1990, submitted a claim for $45,489.13 in unpaid taxes, Appeal File, GSBCA 11960, Exhibit 3, which it reduced to $38,848.13 on April 30, 1992, after various agencies paid taxes due, id., Exhibit 7. 8. In both cases, the contracting officer in her final decision concluded that the customer agencies should have paid these assessed taxes, Appeal File, GSBCA 11959, Exhibit 11; Appeal File, GSBCA 11960, Exhibit 24, although she found that GSA itself was not responsible for the payment, on the grounds that: 1) GSA lacked statutory authority "to obligate the appropriations of other agencies," and 2) GSA could not make payment without proof that the customer agencies accepted the goods, and customer agencies "are in the best position to make this determination." Id. On August 6, 1992, appellant appealed the contracting officer's denial of both of its claims to the Board and asked us to decide them under our accelerated procedure, Rule 14. Appeal File, GSBCA 11959, Exhibit 13; Appeal File, GSBCA 11960, Exhibit 25. Discussion Respondent asks us to dismiss these cases for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that appellant should proceed against the individual agencies that purchased goods under this contract but failed to pay the assessed taxes. We deny the motion. We begin by noting that appellant did attempt to resolve its disputes with the ordering agencies; some of the agencies paid the levied taxes between the time appellant filed its second claim with the contracting officer and April 30, 1992. Finding 7. Although administering schedule contracts has been likened to solving a "Rubik's Cube," Diamond Envelope Corp., GSBCA 10752, 91-3 BCA 24,138, at 120,791, we have held that the GSA schedule contracting officer possesses the sole authority to issue appealable decisions on contract disputes. GF Office Furniture, Ltd., GSBCA 11058, 91-3 BCA 24,157; Centennial Leasing Corp., GSBCA 10915, et al., 91-2 BCA 23,678. Here, appellant has submitted ripe, complete claims to the GSA contracting officer concerning a dispute as to tax liability, which the contracting officer denied. Those denials vested this Board with jurisdiction over these appeals. 41 U.S.C. 607(d) (1988). Citing the FAR "requirements contract" clause, Finding 6, respondent next contends that this Board cannot order GSA to pay the taxes owed by the delinquent agencies, since Congress appropriated funds to those agencies, not GSA, to pay for the goods. This interpretation arguably conflicts with the FAR's "schedule contract" clause's vesting of authority in the schedule contracting officer to "issue final decisions on all disputes which relate to schedule contracts, or arise under orders which cannot be resolved by the ordering office and the contractor." Finding 5. We find that both FAR clauses are compatible with each other and with the Contract Disputes Act (CDA). Pursuant to 41 U.S.C. 612(a), judgments against the Government are paid from the permanent indefinite judgment fund, as described at 31 U.S.C. 1304 (1988). After the contractor is paid, the CDA requires reimbursement "by the agency whose appropriations were used for the contract out of available funds or by obtaining additional appropriations for such purposes." 41 U.S.C. 612(b). The only real issue, which agency must reimburse the judgment fund, is an intragovernmental matter for GSA and the agencies to resolve among themselves. See United States v. Julie Research Laboratories, Inc., 881 F.2d 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Douglass Industries, Inc., GSBCA 9630, 90-2 BCA 22,676 (agencies must "sort out" liability for reimbursement of judgment fund after contractor paid). Finally, respondent contends that appellant has failed to prove that the ordering agencies accepted the goods. However, the documents respondent submitted pursuant to Rule 4 listed the price of the goods and levied taxes and were marked to indicate that the agencies paid the full amount, less taxes. Moreover, the contracts' own payment terms provide that agencies would pay invoices after acceptance. Findings 3, 4. We conclude that the marked invoices submitted indicate that the agencies accepted the goods and find appellant entitled to the $26,881.57 that it claimed for the first contract, number GS-01F-09034, plus the $38,848.13 claimed for the second contract, number GS-02F-48507. Id. We also find appellant entitled to interest on the $26,881.57 connected with the first contract from April 30, 1992. 41 U.S.C. 611; see Finding 7. As to the claim connected with the second contract, appellant submitted a claim for $45,489.13 on March 15, 1990, which it reduced over the next two years to $38,848.13. Finding 7. Since appellant's smaller claim was clearly included in its initial claim of March 15, 1990, appellant is entitled to interest on the principal amount of $38,848.13 running from that date. See Essex Electro Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 960 F.2d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (claim must be in writing and seek a sum certain that is in dispute as a matter of right). Decision These appeals are GRANTED. The amount of $26,881.75 is to be paid pursuant to 41 U.S.C. 612, with interest running from April 30, 1992, until payment, 41 U.S.C. 611. The amount of $38,848.13 is to paid, with interest running from March 15, 1990, until payment. Id. __________________________ ROBERT W. PARKER Board Judge I concur: __________________________ CATHERINE B. HYATT Board Judge