November 21, 1996 GSBCA 13680-RELO In the Matter of CHESLEY E. KIMBREL Chesley E. Kimbrel, APO Area Europe, Claimant. William E. Allan, Chief, Finance and Accounting Liaison Office, Directorate of Support Services, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Denver Center, Denver, CO, appearing for Department of Defense. DANIELS, Board Judge (Chairman). The Department of the Air Force transferred Chesley E. Kimbrel, one of its logistics management specialists, from a permanent duty station at Travis Air Force Base, California, to a new permanent duty station at RAF Mildenhall, in the United Kingdom. Mr. Kimbrel's travel orders authorize him to be reimbursed for real estate expenses incurred in connection with this move. Within a few months of moving, Mr. Kimbrel sold his residence in California and purchased a house in the United Kingdom, and then claimed expenses incurred in making these transactions. The Air Force denied his claim. Mr. Kimbrel maintains that the authorization for reimbursement of real estate expenses was a factor in his decision to sell the home in California and the "sole factor" in his determination to use a real estate agent to sell the house. (The brokerage fees associated with the sale constitute more than half of the amount claimed.) He states that he bought a house in England "primarily [because of] the lack of and cost of rentals in England and the fact that Civilians are not authorized to live on base at RAF Mildenhall." The Air Force acted properly in denying this claim. By regulation, the Government may not reimburse an employee for expenses required to be paid by him in connection with a sale or purchase associated with a transfer of permanent duty stations if the old station is within the United States (or any of a few other specified places) and the new one is not. Reimbursement is possible only if both stations are within the United States (or the other specified locations) or, in a more limited set of circumstances, if the old station is in a "foreign area" (the rest of the world) and the new one is in the United States or one of the specified places. 41 CFR 302-6.1(a), (g) (1994); JTR C14000-A.1, -C. Mr. Kimbrel's contention, at least as to the sale of his California house, is that the Air Force should be estopped from denying his claim. The argument meets the conditions for equitable estoppel: the agency knew that it was transferring the claimant from the United States to another country, and it authorized reimbursement of real estate expenses with the expectation that he would incur such costs; the claimant, not knowing that this authorization was impermissible, relied on it to his detriment by entering into two transactions and thereby assuming financial obligations. See Kozak Micro Systems, Inc., GSBCA 10519, 91-1 BCA  23,342, at 117,060 (citing USA Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 821 F.2d 622, 625 (Fed. Cir. 1987); American Electronic Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 774 F.2d 1110, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Emeco Industries, Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 652, 657 (Ct. Cl. 1973)), aff'd, 989 F.2d 1201 (table) (Fed. Cir. 1993). Estoppel will not lie against the Government, however, where the promise involves a commitment which is not permitted by law. Regardless of the equities of any particular situation, an employee may not usurp control over public funds by binding the Government to spend money in violation of statute or regulation. Kevin S. Foster, GSBCA 13639-RELO, slip op. at 5-6 (Nov. 8, 1996) (citing Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990); Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947)). Thus, Mr. Kimbrel may not receive reimbursement for the real estate expenses he incurred in connection with his transfer from California to the United Kingdom, even though the Air Force authorized that reimbursement, because the authorization was contrary to law. Experiences like this one may show that Government agencies need to provide to personnel who authorize transfers better training regarding the kinds of expenses which may be reimbursable in various circumstances, so that employees will not be misled in the future as to their potential benefits. These experiences do not give us any license to allow repayment to employees who have already been misled, however. _________________________ STEPHEN M. DANIELS Board Judge