December 5, 1996
                                                  


                             GSBCA 13704-RELO


                 In the Matter of CHRISTOPHER L. CHRETIEN


     Christopher L. Chretien, Warner Robins, GA, Claimant.

     G. A. Terrill, Chief, Travel Division, Defense Finance and
Accounting Service, Columbus Center, Columbus, OH, appearing for
Department of Defense.

DANIELS, Board Judge (Chairman).

     Pursuant to the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR), if a federal
civilian employee is transferred from one official station to
another and various conditions are met, miscellaneous expenses
involved in the employee's sale and/or purchase of a residence
shall be reimbursed by the Government under certain circumstances. 
The circumstances are that the expenses "are customarily paid by
the seller of a residence in the locality of the old official
station or by the purchaser of a residence at the new official
station, to the extent they do not exceed specifically stated
limitations, or in the absence thereof, amounts customarily paid in
the locality of the residence."  41 CFR 302-6.2(d) (1995).

     In July 1995, Christopher L. Chretien was transferred from the
Naval Weapons Station in Yorktown, Virginia, to Robins Air Force
Base, Georgia.  Mr. Chretien's orders authorized payment of real
estate expenses.  Two months after the transfer, Mr. Chretien sold
his house in Newport News, Virginia.  He asked the Department of
the Navy to pay $11,391.61 in expenses associated with this
transaction.  The Navy paid only a portion of this amount.

     Mr. Chretien asked the General Accounting Office to review the
agency's disallowance of one particular item, $2,500 in closing
costs he paid for the buyer.  According to the claimant, "the
market trend at the time has been that a seller must offer to pay
closing costs in order to be able to sell their home in a timely
matter [manner?], if at all."  Mr. Chretien also asserts that
"[t]he HUD [United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development] office [in Richmond, Virginia] has even been paying
closing costs on foreclosure sales."

     The FTR provides that the local or area HUD office "will . . .
furnish upon request information concerning local custom and
practices with respect to charging of closing costs related to
either a sale or purchase, including information as to whether such
costs are customarily paid by the seller or purchaser."  41 CFR
302-6(c) (1995).  Mr. Chretien acknowledges that according to HUD's
Richmond office, payment by sellers of buyers' closing costs was
"not reasonable and customary" in the Newport News area at the time
the claimant sold his home.

     An expense is "customarily" paid if, by long and unvarying
habitual actions, constantly repeated, such payment has acquired
the force of a tacit and common consent within a community.  See
Black's Law Dictionary 347 (5th ed. 1979) ("custom and usage").  We
construe the FTR to say that HUD's advice as to local custom should
be followed by the agency unless the claimant or the agency itself
comes forward with persuasive evidence that the advice is not
correct.  This understanding is consistent with the Board's Rule of
Procedure 404(c) (to be codified at 48 CFR 6104.4(c), per 61 Fed.
Reg. 39,098 (1996)), which provides that in our consideration of
claims, the burden is on the claimant to show us why he should
prevail.  See Paul B. Garvey, GSBCA 13658-RELO (Nov. 15, 1996).

     Mr. Chretien's assertion that many sellers of houses in
Newport News in September 1995 had to pay buyers' closing costs if
they wished to sell quickly does not establish that the payment of
these costs was "customary," as we comprehend the meaning of that
term.  The claimant's reference to "market trends" indicates that
the payment of some of his buyer's costs was a means of lowering
the total cost to the buyer in order to make the purchase more
attractive, and the FTR makes this sort of expense non-
reimbursable.  41 CFR 302-6.2(e) (1995); Joseph R. Brimacombe,
B-238372 (Aug. 1, 1990).  Whether HUD pays closing costs on
foreclosure sales in the area is not of particular consequence,
either; the claimant has made no showing that foreclosure sales are
relevant to the conditions under which he sold his house, and even
if they are, HUD's actions do not in themselves constitute
unvarying, habitual, tacit and common community consent.

     We conclude that the Navy's determination not to reimburse Mr.
Chretien for the $2,500 in closing costs he paid for the buyer of
his house was correct.





                                   _________________________
                                   STEPHEN M. DANIELS
                                   Board Judge