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                             December 6, 1996
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                             GSBCA 13830-RELO


                     In the Matter of JAMES M. BOWMAN


     James M. Bowman, Newport, NC, Claimant.

     D. Lisenby, Director, Financial Policy and Systems
Directorate, Kansas City, MO, appearing for Defense Finance and
Accounting Service.

NEILL, Board Judge.

     This case concerns a claim for $3,323.20 which the Disbursing
Office of the Naval Aviation Depot at Cherry Point, North Carolina
seeks to recover from a civilian employee.  The amount in question
represents what the Disbursing Office considers to be excess
compensation for the shipment of the employee's household goods. 
We find that the payment made was correct and that Mr. Bowman
should not be required to return the amount in question.  

     The facts of this case are as follows.  On July 27, 1994, the
Naval Aviation Depot in Norfolk, Virginia, issued permanent change
of station (PCS) travel orders to James Bowman, a civilian employee
at the Depot.  The orders identify the Naval Aviation Depot at
Cherry Point, North Carolina, as Mr. Bowman's new official work
station and indicate a duty reporting date of August 22, 1994.  The
orders also state the following regarding shipment of Mr. Bowman's
household goods (HHG):  "AUTHORIZE SHIPMENT OF HOUSEHOLD GOOD [sic]
BY SELF MOVE (U-HAUL) NOT TO EXCEED THE COST OF GBL (GOVERNMENT
BILL OF LADING) MOVE."

     Mr. Bowman reported to Cherry Point on August 21, 1994, and
lived in temporary quarters until he found housing for his family. 
He moved his family and his household goods on October 2, 1994. 
Prior to the move, however, on September 27, 1994, Mr. Bowman
requested that the travel office at the Norfolk Depot correct his
travel orders to authorize "commuted rate system" (as opposed to
GBL rate) for shipment of his household goods.  The travel office
agreed that the authorization in the orders was incorrect.  Mr.
Bowman was told that they would be amended.  The formal amendment
of the orders, however, was not issued until after the move was
completed, namely October 14. 

     On October 18, Mr. Bowman submitted his travel voucher.  The
Disbursing Office at Cherry Point calculated that, based on the
commuted rate schedule, Mr. Bowman was entitled to $3,343.20 for
shipment of his household goods.  Sometime thereafter, the
Disbursing Office at Cherry Point determined that, with regard to
a number of employees transferred to Cherry Point from the Naval
Aviation Depot at Norfolk, the Norfolk travel office had  failed to 
undertake a cost comparison of commuted rates to actual costs using
a GBL before authorizing the employees to use the former rates. 
Mr. Bowman was one of these employees.  

     In October of the following year, therefore, an after-the-fact
cost comparison was done by the Norfolk Depot.  The comparison 
showed that the estimated cost of shipping Mr. Bowman's goods by
GBL would have been considerably cheaper than payment of commuted
rates for shipment of the goods.  Given the results of this after-
the-fact cost comparison, the Naval Depot at Norfolk, on October
16, 1995, amended Mr. Bowman's travel orders yet another time. 
This time the orders were changed to read: "IF EMPLOYEE MAKES OTHER
ARRANGEMENTS TO MOVE HHG [household goods], REIMBURSEMENT WILL BE
MADE FOR ACTUAL EXPENSES NTE [not to exceed] GBL RATE OF $34.00 PER
CWT [hundred weight]."  

     Mr. Bowman was then directed to provide evidence of actual
expenses associated with the shipment of his household goods so
that his reimbursement could be recalculated.  He declined to do
so.  The Disbursing Office, therefore, proceeded to recalculate his
claim for reimbursement using the only receipt of actual expense
available, namely, weight tickets which represented a cost of $20. 
This amount was, therefore deducted, from the $3,343.20 originally
paid to him for shipment of his household goods.  On October 26,
1995, the Disbursing Office demanded Mr. Bowman return the balance
of $3,323.20 on the ground that this amount represented an
"overpayment of a travel advance."

     By letter dated November 16, 1995, the Commanding Officer of
the Naval Aviation Depot at Cherry Point wrote the Navy s Assistant
Secretary for Financial Management and Comptroller.  He pointed out
the inequities of the situation confronting Mr. Bowman and asked
that a ruling on the matter be sought from the General Accounting
Office (GAO).  Rather than refer the matter to the GAO, the Office
of the Assistant Secretary, in early April 1996, forwarded the case
to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) office in
Kansas City.

     In early May, 1996, DFAS ruled on Mr. Bowman s claim.  The
claim was denied.  Relying on paragraph C8001-D3c of the Department
of Defense s Joint Travel Regulations (JTR), DFAS explained that 
the commuted rate schedule can be authorized only if it is the most
economical method.  According to DFAS, the cost comparison done
after Mr. Bowman s move showed that in this case the commuted rate
schedule is not the most economical method.  Therefore, any
authorization to use the commuted rate schedule cannot be
considered valid.  

     Mr. Bowman, through his Congressman, has since indicated to
DFAS that he strongly disagrees with the ruling on his claim. 
DFAS, on his behalf, has forwarded the case to us for decision.  


                                Discussion

     In a separate decision issued on this same date, we have
discussed at length the basic issue raised in this case.  Jeffrey
P. Herman, GSBCA 13832-RELO (Dec. 6,1996).  In that decision, we
describe the two methods for transporting household goods, namely,
the actual expense method and the commuted rate method.  The Herman
decision also examines the central question of whether an agency
can reimburse an employee for the movement of household goods using
the commuted rate schedule, if it determines, only after the move,
that the commuted rate schedule was not more economical than the
actual expense method.  

     The agency in this case, being an organizational component of
the Department of Defense (DOD), relies on a provision contained in
the DOD travel regulation, the JTR, which applies to all DOD
civilian employees.  The JTR, however, integrates and supplements
the Government's primary travel regulation, the Federal Travel
Regulation (FTR).  The FTR, except for employees of the judicial
branch, applies to all civilian employees of Government agencies,
including civilian employees of the Department of Defense.   41 CFR
301-1.2(a).  The provision of the JTR on which the agency relies
states: 

     A cost comparison will be made between the actual expense
     (GBL) and commuted rate methods of shipping HHG.  In the
     event the estimated cost under one method exceeds the
     estimated cost under the other method by more than $100,
     the more economical method will be used.  

JTR C8001-D3c.  It is the agency s position that this provision
applies equally whether the cost comparison is done before or after
the employee s move.    

     For reasons explained in detail in the Herman decision, we
have concluded that, under the FTR and the statute which it
implements, this cost comparison must be done before the method of
transporting the goods is selected.  This restriction likewise
applies to any agency supplement of the FTR such as the JTR.  In
this case, as in the Herman case, we have determined that the
agency failed to perform a cost comparison before issuing orders to
Mr. Bowman to undertake a self-move.  This effectually renders the
JTR provision inoperative and compels the agency to look to the FTR 
for guidance on how to proceed.  Under the FTR, in the absence of
a cost comparison showing that the actual expense method is more
economical, employees are to be reimbursed for individual moves
according to the commuted rate schedule.  

     Given the facts in this case, it is apparent that, at the time
of Mr. Bowman's move, both he and the local base officials at
Norfolk anticipated that he would be reimbursed for the movement of
his household goods using the commuted rate schedule.  The formal
amendment of his orders shortly after the move supports this
conclusion.  We, therefore, see no reason why Mr. Bowman s claim
should not have been paid pursuant to the FTR using the commuted
rate.  The  amounts already paid to Mr. Bowman by the base
Disbursing Office using the commuted rate, therefore, need not be
refunded.  If they have been recovered by the agency through salary
set-off, they should be returned to him promptly.    


                                   _____________________
                                   EDWIN B. NEILL
                                   Board Judge