November 17, 1997 GSBCA 14182-RELO In the Matter of MICHAEL S. KNEZEVICH Michael S. Knezevich, Levittown, PR, Claimant. Edgardo Aviles, Travel Team Leader, U. S. Customs Service, Indianapolis, IN, appearing for Department of the Treasury. DANIELS, Board Judge (Chairman). The United States Customs Service transferred one of its employees, Michael S. Knezevich, from Miami, Florida, to Key West, Florida, on December 1, 1994. Almost immediately thereafter, the agency sent Mr. Knezevich on temporary duty assignments in Miami and Puerto Rico. The temporary duty lasted until November 8, 1995. When Mr. Knezevich left Miami in 1994, he put his household goods in storage. The goods remained in storage for 329 days. The Customs Service acknowledges an obligation to pay for the first 180 days of storage but maintains that the employee is responsible for the remaining 149 days. Mr. Knezevich notes that the agency (in April 1995) agreed to pay for the storage until he had relocated. He also maintains that the agency should pay the entire bill since, by sending him on temporary duty, it precluded him from finding a permanent home earlier than he did. The provision of the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) on which the Customs Service relies, 41 CFR 302-8.2(d) (1994), says that when an agency authorizes temporary storage in connection with a shipment of a transferred employee's household goods, the Government will pay for 90 days of storage and may, on an employee's written request, extend this time by "an additional period not to exceed 90 days under certain conditions." Among the conditions for which an extension is appropriate is an intervening temporary duty assignment. Until mid-1996, the General Accounting Office (GAO) settled claims against the United States involving relocation expenses incurred by federal employees. The GAO held that because the regulation cited by the Customs Service is clear, it must be strictly applied, even in situations where application would be unfair to an employee or the agency has mistakenly advised the employee that it would continue to pay for storage of his goods. Linda Towson Hilliard, B-259606 (June 12, 1995); David C. Funk, B-227488 (Dec. 29, 1987). The GAO believed that to eliminate inequities in the application of the regulation, the rule should be amended to allow agencies discretion to extend the time period beyond 180 days where an agency action is the reason for the employee's need for further storage. Allan W. Beres, B-259606, et al. (Dec. 28, 1995). We agree with the GAO's position that under the portion of the FTR which deals with relocation allowances for employees who are transferred in the interest of the Government from one permanent duty station to another, 41 CFR ch. 302, an agency may pay for no more than 180 days of temporary storage of an employee's household goods. In our view, however, Mr. Knezevich's predicament was not solely attributable to such a transfer. The fact that the agency put him on temporary duty for the eleven months right after his reassignment occurred was the cause of his inability to find a permanent destination for his goods. Allowances for employees on temporary duty are covered by another part of the FTR, 41 CFR ch. 301. In this unusual circumstance of continuous, very long-term temporary duty, storage costs might more appropriately be considered a cost of travel rather than a cost of elocation. We therefore look to chapter 301 in addition to chapter 302 for guidance in determining whether the agency or the employee should pay for the last 149 days of storage. We find relevant guidance in paragraph 301-9.1(e) of the FTR, which provides: "Miscellaneous expenditures not enumerated in this section, when necessarily incurred by the traveler in connection with the transaction of official business, shall be allowed when approved." Charges for the temporary storage of household goods are surely miscellaneous in the context of employees' travel, since only on rare instances might they be associated with travel. Mr. Knezevich, however, clearly incurred the charges in question as a direct result of the agency's orders that he go on temporary duty away from his new permanent duty station. The charges were therefore incurred, while traveling from that station, in connection with the transaction of official business. The agency approved payment of the charges (though it later believed that such approval was not permissible). Consequently, payment should be allowed as a cost of the claimant's temporary duty, even though it is not appropriately considered a cost of relocation. _________________________ STEPHEN M. DANIELS Board Judge