Board of Contract Appeals General Services Administration Washington, D.C. 20405 _________________ May 29, 1998 _________________ GSBCA 14493-RELO In the Matter of SARAH BLANDING Sarah Blanding, Parris Island, SC, Claimant. E.R. Nelson, Jr., Director, Real Estate Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southern Division, North Charleston, SC, appearing for Department of the Navy. NEILL, Board Judge. Claimant, Ms. Sarah Blanding, is a civilian employee of the United States Navy. She asks that we review a determination made by her agency that she is not entitled to reimbursement of certain costs incurred when she sold her home incident to a permanent change of station move. For the reasons set out below, we affirm the agency s initial determination that her claim should not be paid. Background On March 22, 1996, claimant was issued orders transferring her from her then current duty station in Marietta, Georgia, to Parris Island, South Carolina. Her orders stated that she was entitled to real estate expenses in conjunction with her transfer. Reimbursement for the purchase of a residence at her new duty station was not to exceed $11,198, and reimbursement for the sale of her residence at her old duty station was not to exceed $22,398. Ms. Blanding eventually sold her residence in Marietta for $119,000. Settlement took place on June 15, 1997. Shortly thereafter she submitted a claim for reimbursement of costs paid by her at settlement. Some of these costs were incurred on her own behalf while others were incurred on behalf of the purchaser but paid by her at settlement. Her claim came to a total of $10,959. The Navy paid $8609 of her claim. The remaining costs of $2350 were denied on the ground that these were costs incurred on behalf of the purchaser and not normally paid by the seller. The costs sought by Ms. Blanding which the agency denied as not reimbursable were as follows: Loan Origination Fee $ 577.00 Tax Service Fee 69.00 CMMC Commitment Fee 350.00 Express Mail 25.00 Title Examination 125.00 Attorney's Fee 400.00 Flood Determination Fee 11.00 Flood Life of Loan Certification Fee 7.00 Courier Fee ($50+$35) 85.00 Recording Fee (Deed/Mortgage) 70.00 Mortgage Stamps 346.50 Processing Fee 284.50 $2,350.00 Claimant asks that we review the agency's determination that she is not entitled to these costs. Discussion Ms. Blanding does not deny that in this particular case the costs denied her by the agency were costs incurred on behalf of the purchaser rather than on her own behalf as the seller. Instead, she argues that she is entitled to reimbursement based on the wording of a section-heading in the Joint Travel Regulations (JTR) of the Department of Defense. As a civilian employee of the Department she is, indeed, subject to the JTR. The specific section of the JTR to which she refers us is found in Chapter 14. This chapter deals with allowances for expenses incurred by transferred employees in connection with real estate transactions and unexpired leases. Ms. Blanding refers us to Section C14002, which is entitled: "Allowable Expenses For Sale or Purchase of Residence." She states that the word "or" in this heading is the operative word. From this we conclude that it is her contention that, because the title of this section of the regulation reads as it does, she is entitled to the benefits provided in the section regardless of whether she is a purchaser or seller. Claimant's reading of the section heading is clearly out of context. In the body of the same section, it is repeatedly stated that legal expenses as well as various miscellaneous and incidental charges associated with the sale or purchase of a house are generally recoverable provided "they are customarily paid by the seller of a residence at the old duty station or, if customarily paid by the purchaser of a residence at the new duty station, to the extent that they do not exceed amounts customarily charged in the locality of the residence." JTR C14002-A.3, -A.4(a), -A.4(c), -A.6. Somewhat to our surprise, the agency in its report to us now represents that the costs Ms. Blanding seeks are "customary for the Atlanta region and reimbursable to the claimant." The statement hardly resolves the matter even though the agency has now apparently changed its mind and concluded that the claimant is entitled to be paid. From the agency's statement we can conclude only that the costs in question do not exceed the amounts customarily charged in the area. Nothing, however, is said about who customarily pays these costs in the Atlanta area. Despite the agency's apparent change in position, we are not prepared to infer from this fact alone that, in the Atlanta area, the seller customarily pays any or all of the costs in question. The Navy, in reviewing Ms. Blanding s initial claim, understandably questioned whether it is customary in the Atlanta region for the seller of a home to pay for so many of the costs which normally are associated with the buyer's own financing and purchase of that home. In reviewing the merits of this case, we have similar doubts. Nothing in the record for this case dispels these doubts. When questions of local custom arise, the burden is on the claimant to show why he or she should prevail. 48 CFR 6104.4(c); Pierre S. Ware, GSBCA 14150-RELO, 97-2 BCA 29,061; Christopher L. Chretien, GSBCA 13704-RELO, 97-1 BCA 28,701 (1996). To convince us that the agency's initial decision to deny these costs was incorrect, claimant must provide persuasive evidence that it is indeed customary in the Atlanta region for the seller to respond for these costs. Ms. Blanding claims entitlement based solely upon wording in the JTR which, as we have pointed out, is quoted clearly out of context with the applicable regulation when read as a whole. The agency, on the other hand, although now stating in its report to us that the costs may be paid, has not addressed this issue. Despite the conclusions of the claimant and the agency, no corroborating evidence in the record suggests that it is customary in the Atlanta area for the seller to pay any of these costs which were incurred on behalf of the purchaser. By order dated April 9, 1998, the Board sought from the agency some clarification regarding its apparent change in position. Specifically, the Navy was asked why it did not pay Ms. Blanding and seek to have this case dismissed if it now believes that claimant is entitled to the costs in question. The agency chose not to respond to the Board s order. In the absence of a reply, we have proceeded to rule on the merits of Ms. Blanding s claim based on the record before us. Given the lack of any persuasive evidence that the agency's original concerns were without a reasonable basis, the initial determination denying the costs stands. Ms. Blanding's claim for additional reimbursement is denied. _________________________ EDWIN B. NEILL Board Judge