Board of Contract Appeals General Services Administration Washington, D.C. 20405 July 28, 1998 GSBCA 14587-RELO In the Matter of MARJORIE A. AHLQUIST Marjorie A. Ahlquist, Wilmington, NC, Claimant. Frank A. Baldwin, Office of General Counsel, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Indianapolis Center, Indianapolis, IN, appearing for Department of Defense. DANIELS, Board Judge (Chairman). The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) transferred one of its employees, Marjorie A. Ahlquist, from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Wilmington, North Carolina, in early 1998. DFAS authorized payment to Ms. Ahlquist of temporary quarters subsistence expenses (TQSE) for sixty days. Ms. Ahlquist later asked that payment be authorized for an additional sixty days. DFAS denied this request. Ms. Ahlquist has asked us to review the agency's decision. We find that DFAS's determination was reasonable. Ms. Ahlquist states that she had initially planned to have a new residence constructed for her in Wilmington. When she arrived there, she discovered that new construction in the area was much more expensive than she had expected. She then began to look at existing houses, and although she found many available, she did not like their floor plans. By May 1998, when she filed her claim with this Board, she was considering the purchase of either a new residence or an existing home. A month later, she signed an agreement to buy a home which would be built for her. The regulation governing this matter is paragraph C13115-B of the Joint Travel Regulations (JTR) (Apr. 1, 1998). This paragraph provides: 1. TQSE may be authorized for an additional period [beyond the initial sixty days] of up to 60 consecutive days provided the head of the DOD [Department of Defense] component concerned, or designee, determines there are compelling reasons (due to circumstances beyond the employee's control) for the continued temporary quarters occupancy. . . . . . . . 3. Authorizations to extend the TQSE period and the number of days authorized must be held to a minimum. See also 5 U.S.C.A. 5724a(c)(2) (West Supp. 1998); 41 CFR 302-5.105 (1997). The paragraph lists four "[e]xamples of circumstances which might be considered beyond the employee's control." Ms. Ahlquist believes that her situation is covered by one of these examples, "delayed occupancy of new permanent quarters because of unanticipated problems (e.g., delays in settlement for new quarters, short-term delay in construction of a new dwelling)." JTR C13115-B.1.b. The agency considered both this example and another -- "inability to locate permanent quarters adequate for family needs because of housing conditions at the new [permanent duty station]," id. C13115-B.1.c -- before denying the employee's request. We have recently described the standard under which we review agency determinations regarding extension of the TQSE period: Because statute and regulation make the grant of additional time in which an employee may receive TQSE contingent on the existence of "compelling reasons" for the continued occupancy of temporary quarters, and afford an agency broad discretion in deciding whether such reasons are present, we will not overturn an agency's determination as to an extension of the period unless we find it to have been arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Daniel A. Rishe, GSBCA 14444-RELO [98-1 BCA 29,677] (and cases cited therein); Baron L. Hudson, GSBCA 14284-RELO, 98-1 BCA 29,527. Rifat A. Ajjuri, GSBCA 14506-RELO (May 27, 1998). Under this standard, we cannot fault DFAS's decision not to extend the time within which it would pay for Ms. Ahlquist's TQSE. The high cost of new home construction in the Wilmington area, while it may not have been anticipated by this employee, is not the sort of short-term difficulty, beyond the employee's control, which might delay an employee's occupancy of permanent quarters and thereby justify an extension of the TQSE period consistent with the example cited by the claimant, particularly given the JTR's instruction to hold such extensions to a minimum. Ms. Ahlquist has presented no information on the basis of which DFAS (or we) could conclude that the cost of new construction prevented her from buying a residence. Nor is the employee's inability to find an existing house with a floor plan she liked proof that the could not locate permanent quarters adequate for family needs. It demonstrates merely that she chose not buy one of the many available homes because of personal preference. _________________________ STEPHEN M. DANIELS Board Judge