January 16, 1998 GSBCA 14391-TRAV In the Matter of MICHAEL E. DAVIDSON Michael E. Davidson, Chicago, IL, Claimant. Kassie A. Billingsley, Director, Office of Financial and Resource Management, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, appearing for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. GOODMAN, Board Judge. Claimant, Michael E. Davidson, is an employee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Chicago, Illinois district office. He purchased a round-trip ticket for airfare through his personal travel agent for a temporary duty (TDY) assignment to Los Angeles, California. The agency has authorized reimbursement of the Government contract carrier fare, which is less than claimant actually paid for his ticket. Claimant has requested payment of $284.08 for reimbursement of the airfare over the contract purchase price. The agency has requested this Board, pursuant to 31 U.S.C.A. 3529 (West Supp. 1997), to render a decision as to whether claimant is entitled to reimbursement for this amount. As discussed herein, we find that claimant is not entitled to be paid the amount he seeks. On October 3, 1997, an official TDY travel authorization and memorandum addressing his travel requirements were sent to claimant at his duty station in Chicago, approving travel from Chicago to Los Angeles on October 19-24, 1997, including common carrier cost of $300. On October 13, 1997, claimant purchased a nonrefundable ticket for $565.50 from his personal travel agent. The fare was from Chicago to Los Angeles on October 20, 1997, and from Oakland, California, stopping in Los Angeles, with a final destination of Chicago on October 26, 1997. The return trip originated in Oakland because claimant conducted personal travel (for which he paid himself) to that location prior to returning back to his duty station. The flight from Oakland to Chicago cost no more than a flight from Los Angeles to Chicago. The agency has authorized payment of $281.42, the amount of the round-trip fare had the ticket been purchased from a Government contract carrier through a Government travel agent. Claimant requests reimbursement of the $284.08 which he paid above the authorized amount, and states as follows: I made travel arrangements through my personal travel agent simply because I make all travel arrangements through her. I did not anticipate the problems that doing so would cause for myself or the agency. . . . I have recently been elected President of Local 3504. . . . I have not normally had to deal with travel for the EEOC that required air travel. Thus, I am unfamiliar with the procedures . . . of such arrangements. When advised of the . . . meeting I made travel arrangements through my personal travel agent. Nothing in any of the information I received stated or implied that I could not make travel arrangements in this manner. In fact, at one point, I had a conference call conversation involving Ilene Jones, myself and my travel agent. . . . While she did indicate that this was not the typical manner of making travel arrangements, she did not state that I could not do so. Had she advised me that I must or should make travel arrangements through a government approved agency, I could have done so at that point. This same issue was discussed in our previous decision Glenn M. Levine, M.D., GSBCA 13837-RELO, 97-2 BCA 29,224. In that decision, we emphasized that the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR), paragraph 301-15.21, requires employees of executive agencies to use Government contract air carriers when traveling on official business. There are three exceptions to mandatory use of Government contract carriers: (1) seating space is not available in time to accomplish the purpose of the travel, or the scheduled service would require the traveler to incur overnight lodging expenses; (2) the carrier's schedule for the travel is inconsistent with the Government's policy of scheduling travel to the maximum extent practical during normal working hours; and (3) a cost comparison establishes that (i) a restricted or unrestricted coach fare is lower than the contract fare or other fare offered by the awardee, all other factors being equal, or (ii) use of a noncontract coach fare available to the general public would, when added to certain enumerated factors, result in lower costs to the Government than the costs that would accrue if the comparable cost factors were added to the contract fare. 41 CFR 301-15.27(b)(1)-(b)(3) (1997). In the instant case, claimant has neither argued nor demonstrated the applicability of any of these exceptions. Further, justification for the use of noncontract carriers must be authorized on individual travel orders or approved on vouchers. 41 CFR 301-15.27(a). As this Board recognized in Abdul Kaliq Raja, GSBCA 14029-TRAV, 97-1 BCA 28,944, "[i]n the absence of specific authorization or approval stated on, or attached to, the travel authorization or travel voucher, a civilian employee is responsible for any difference in the cost that may result from the traveler's unauthorized use of noncontract service. 41 CFR 301-15.28." The fact that claimant's travel voucher estimated his total travel common carrier cost to be $300 (slightly more than the contract carrier price, but less than the actual fare purchased) does not constitute an authorization to use a noncontract carrier. Claimant contends that because he was not aware of Government contract carrier fares and was never advised that they existed, he should not be expected to pay the difference between the regular coach fare and Government fare. Although it is unfortunate that claimant's agency failed to apprise him of basic Government travel rules, this does not entitle claimant to reimbursement of regular coach fare. The FTR does contain an exception for the "infrequent traveler," but limits reimbursement to the Government contract carrier fare. This exception states: [T]he infrequent traveler, unaware of the general prohibition against the use of travel agents, who inadvertently purchases transportation with personal funds from a travel agent without the required advance administrative approval, may be granted an exception to the preclusive provisions on a one-time basis and may be paid for the travel costs incurred not to exceed the cost which would have been properly chargeable to the Government if the transportation service had been purchased directly from the carrier. In such cases, the traveler will be advised that recurrence of such use of travel agents will result in denial of reimbursement unless it can be demonstrated that the traveler had no alternative. 41 CFR 301-3.4(b)(2)(ii). Although the agency concedes that claimant qualifies under this exception, he is not entitled to any additional reimbursement over and above the contract carrier rate of $281.42 for which the agency has already authorized payment. ____________________ ALLAN H. GOODMAN Board Judge