Board of Contract Appeals General Services Administration Washington, D.C. 20405 ________________ May 19, 1998 ________________ GSBCA 14443-TRAV In the Matter of CAROLYN K. STILES Carolyn K. Stiles, San Antonio, TX, Claimant. Kassie A. Billingsley, Director, Office of Financial and Resource Management, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, appearing for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. NEILL, Board Judge. Claimant in this case, Carolyn K. Stiles, is an employee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She has asked the Board to review a determination made by her agency which disallowed reimbursement for three long distance telephone calls made to her home in Oklahoma City while she was on official travel. We conclude that she should be paid for the calls. Background In June 1997, Ms. Stiles transferred from the EEOC office in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, to the EEOC office in San Antonio, Texas. Although transferred to San Antonio, Ms. Stiles did not sell her home of twenty-three years in Oklahoma City. Rather, she retained it as a permanent residence and arranged for her dependent daughter to continue living there. On arrival in San Antonio, she moved into an apartment with a six-month lease. In the fall of 1997, Ms. Stiles was sent on official travel at least twice. The travel orders issued to her each time provided: "Employee entitled to one ld [long distance] call daily to residence." While on travel Ms. Stiles called her home in Oklahoma City to speak with her daughter. One of these calls was made on November 6, 1997, at a cost of $5.69. The other two calls were made on November 18, 1997, during the course of a separate three day trip. These two calls cost $5.54 and $4.85 respectively. The agency refuses to reimburse Ms. Stiles for the cost of the three calls. It contends that the authorization in her travel orders to call her residence daily refers to her residence at her new duty station in San Antonio and not to her former residence in Oklahoma City. Ms. Stiles disagrees. In seeking our review of the agency's determination, she points out that her home in Oklahoma City remains her home and residence notwithstanding the fact that she now also maintains a residence in San Antonio. Because her orders did not specifically state that the residence to which she was authorized to call was to be the residence she maintains at her new duty station, Ms. Stiles contends that she was entitled to call her residence in Oklahoma. Discussion Section 301-6.4 of the Federal Travel Regulation provides that an employee s use of Government and commercial telephone systems while on official travel is in accordance with directives issued pursuant to the Federal Property Management Regulations (FPMR). This latter set of regulations describes policies and procedures for the use of Government-provided and commercial long distance telephone service paid for by the Government. The FPMR also authorizes agencies to issue their own directives on using telephone facilities and services. One purpose of these agency directives is to further define calls said to be necessary in the Government s interest. See 41 CFR 101-35.201(d)(3) (1997). Ms. Stiles' agency, the EEOC, has in fact issued regulations pursuant to authorization found in the FPMR. EEOC Order 350.002 of February 10, 1997, provides guidance on telephone service and usage. Section 7(c) of that order gives several examples of the types of calls which may be made over the Government telephone systems, including calls over commercial systems, which will be paid for by the Government. Among these examples are the following: (3) brief calls by an employee traveling for more than one night on Government business in the U.S. (but not more than an average of one call per day); [and] . . . . (5) brief calls by an employee to speak to a spouse, dependent, or minor children (or those responsible for them; e.g., schools or day-care centers)[.] Ms. Stiles situation is admittedly somewhat unusual. It is understandable that she and the agency are in disagreement over whether she is entitled to reimbursement for the three calls in question. Most civilian federal employees, upon being transferred from one duty station to another, relinquish the residence which they maintained at the former duty station once they have established residence at their new duty station. Hence, an authorization to make a long distance call to one s residence would normally be understood as applying to the employee s residence at the new duty station. There may be exceptions, however. While the law prohibits individuals from having more than one domicile, no such limitation exists regarding residences. See Black's Law Dictionary 435 (5th ed. 1979). In this case, we are satisfied that Ms. Stiles has elected to maintain two residences, one in Oklahoma City and one in San Antonio. Ms. Stiles correctly points out that the authorization in her travel orders had no specific qualification as to which residence she could call. Furthermore, the obvious intent of the agency s authorization to call one s residence is to permit the employee, when on travel, to remain in touch with his or her family. Given the language of the actual authorization, therefore, and the fact that Ms. Stiles dependent daughter was at the claimant s Oklahoma residence, we find that she reasonably concluded that, while on travel, she was authorized to call her residence in Oklahoma City to talk to her daughter. There remains the question of whether Ms. Stiles' orders should be interpreted as limiting the authorized calls to her residence to one per day. The orders expressly stated that she was entitled to one long distance call daily. The EEOC regulation quoted above resolves this last question in claimant s favor. Such calls are permitted, provided they are not more than an average of one call per day. Since the two calls made on November 18 were made during the course of a three day trip and no other claim has been made for similar calls during that period, Ms. Stiles claim is within the limit established by the agency regulation. The authorization in the travel orders should be interpreted in the light of that regulation. We conclude, therefore, that Ms. Stiles expectation of reimbursement was reasonable and that her claim for the costs of calls made, while on travel, to her dependent daughter at her residence in Oklahoma City should be paid. __________________________ EDWIN B. NEILL Board Judge